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Intersection of Privacy and Security
The Intersection of Privacy and Security
Abstract
There is a common misconception that privacy and security are the same thing. The reality
is that while there is an intersection of these two topics, there are differences between security
and privacy. This paper illustrates similarities and differences between these topics.

Background
The purpose of this paper is to begin to develop understanding of the differences between
privacy and security. This differentiation is important because many practitioners and
researchers discount the differences and assume that by providing a secure computing
environment that privacy is also served. We offer anecdotal evidence that this notion is untrue
and develop new areas for privacy and security researchers to further explore the differences.
The arguments presented here also raise empirical and contingent questions about the frequency,
generalizability, and importance of the differences identified.
Many analogies can be drawn from different areas of life experience. For example, consider
the idea of stuffing money under the mattress. People who are often distrustful of banks or have
income that they want to keep unrecorded will often stash cash at home. This cash is private
because banks and the IRS do not know about it. Thus, hidden cash is a form of private wealth.
But, is the money secure? No; for money to be secure, it should be insured and stored in an
institution that can offer some level of guaranty, such as a bank. The same relationship holds
true for many situations relating to Information Technology (IT) privacy and security.
Consider the example of Internet email. By default, Internet email is neither private nor
secure. Basic security and privacy can be added by simply employing passwords on computers
and accounts. Further privacy is added via encryption so that the message cannot be altered or
read by unauthorized personnel. At this point the message is private given that the encryption
employed and the keys are sufficient and, because of passwords, there is some security.
However, information transmitted via email may breach corporate security or leak customers'
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Therefore, even with privacy, security can be
breached. To summarize this relationship, privacy does not offer security; there cannot be
privacy without also having some security.
The next sections of the paper define privacy and security constructs and characteristics that
are the basis for this research. Then, the commonalities between privacy and security are
developed. Next, intersections of privacy and security are discussed to develop understanding of
the differences of the constructs. From the intersection, directions for research to further develop
our understanding of the differences between privacy and security are discussed.

What is Privacy?
Privacy has many facets and can be defined in many ways. Personal privacy generally applies
to keeping confidential anything an individual does not want known, such as a person's location
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(Solove, 2006). For our purposes, privacy is "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). Westin’s definition is appropriate by its applicability
to both individuals and institutions, and its focus on information. Therefore, in this research, this
definition describes information privacy.
Characteristics of privacy include anonymity, fair use, and controlled access, life cycle,
and use for integration (Culnan, 1995; Clarke, 1999; Gellman, 1998; Solove, 2004). No
empirical research validating these characteristics could be found, thus, each is debatable and a
subject for further research. Each of these characteristics is defined in this section.
Anonymity is defined as “of unknown authorship or agency” and “bearing no name”
(Landau, 1992, p. 29) and usually applies to written materials. In this research we adapt this
definition to relate to personally identifiable information (PII) for customers, employees, clients,
volunteers, etc. about whom information is collected by organizations. While a whole suite of
Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) has developed in the last ten years, most organizations do
not use it. Nor do organizations routinely encrypt data as a gross method of protecting records.
Evidence of this problem is reported almost daily by Attrition.org’s breach list which shows a
doubling of data leaks around the globe (Attrition.org, 2008). Thus, anonymity is problematic in
many organizations.
Fair Use concepts stem from two sources – OECD Privacy Guidelines (1980, 1998) and
U.S. Fair Information Practices (Culnan, 1995; U.S. Privacy Act of 1974). In essence, the
principles address limited data collection relevant to the context, limited data usage disclosed
before use, protection against unauthorized access or use, no sharing, and all with that data
subject’s consent.
Access is defined as “right to approach, use, etc.” (Landau, 1992, p. 5). “Privacy depends
on degrees of accessibility of information...” (Solove, 2004, p. 213). Access is partially covered
under Fair Use concepts but those concepts assume no movement off organizational premises by
authorized persons, and, therefore, do not go far enough to cover requirements for, e.g.,
encryption, or restricted location/device characteristics that today’s uses require. Therefore, this
extended view of access is developed as a separate concept.
Use usually refers to using data for other than agreed upon uses by the collecting
organization. In this research, ‘use for integration’ refers to the industry practice of 3rd parties
taking data from disparate sources for purposes of integration, profiling, and resale (Solove,
2004). This use of PII had not developed when the U.S. Fair Information Practice and EU Fair
Use practices laws were developed. Therefore, integration (as a negative characteristic of
privacy) is developed as a separate concept.

What is Security?
Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss Security typically is
associated with characteristics of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA), all of which
are controlled to implement computer security. A fourth characteristic, non-repudiation is

Page 2
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-38

Intersection of Privacy and Security
increasingly viewed as a requirement of secure computing. Each of the characteristics is defined
in this section.
Confidentiality is defined as “assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, processes, or devices” (Krutz and Vines, 2004). It is important to note that
confidentiality is different than privacy. Access is granted or denied based upon authorization
and therefore information can be confidential but not private.
Integrity is accuracy of the information and the IT controls in place to protect against
unauthorized modification or destruction. It is possible for information to be private but not have
integrity because it can be modified or deleted (Merkow & Breithaupt, 2005).
Availability is timely, reliable access to data and information services that are restricted for
only authorized users (Krutz and Vines, 2004; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2005) Among the CIA
components, Availability is probably the most antithetical to privacy in that making information
available makes it public that is, not private.
Finally, Non-Repudiation is the assurance that a sender of “data is provided with proof of
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can later
deny having processed the data” (Krutz & Vines, 2004). As we examine the differences between
Privacy and Security, we will see that in all cases non-repudiation has a negative relationship to
privacy characteristics.

Commonalities between Privacy and Security
There are areas of commonality that are also a source of some of the conceptual blurring of
boundaries between privacy and security. Some organizational commonalities might include
corporate policy, governance, training, and technical implementation.
The purpose of corporate policy for both privacy and security is to identify the position of
management relative to the topic, delegate responsibility, identify the scope of policy affect,
define compliance requirements, and define reprisals for lack of compliance. Corporate policy
drives actions and cultural response to privacy and security needs. Privacy and security are
treated as one in many companies and only with the huge number of data leaks and breaches are
coming to be understood as different.
In many companies, the corporate and technical groups responsible for security (which has
had corporate awareness of need for over 20 years) are also responsible for privacy. Training of
staff can cover both privacy and security in single session. Corporate statements of privacy
and/or security for which many companies require annual reading and signing, can also
incorporate both concepts in one page. In implementation, sometimes privacy and security are
served by the same actions. The many commonalities have contributed to the conceptual
confusion between privacy and security. Additionally, the technical implementation of security
and privacy programs can use the same hardware, software, often are maintained by the same
technicians.
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Clearly, there are commonalities of privacy and security. In large data breaches, both
privacy and security can be lost. The 2007 data breach at the U. S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) is just one example of this common aspect of privacy and Security. In the DOT example,
the daughter of a teleworker installed Limewire P2P Sharing software on her mother’s computer,
inadvertently sharing DOT and National Archives files across the Internet (Broach, 2007).
While this is a clear example of both security and privacy being lost, there are other examples
where the intersections differ depending on the components of privacy and security examined.

Intersections of Privacy and Security
Evaluation of the intersection of privacy and security allows us to tease out implementation
considerations in different situations. There are many ways to look at the privacy-security
intersection; this paper concentrates on the intersection of data and agent actions as they each
relate to privacy and security characteristics. Privacy considerations include anonymity,
controlled life cycle, monitored use, fair use (CITE), controlled access, and the negative notion
of data profiling and integration. Security considerations include CIA – confidentiality,
integrity, and availability as well as non-repudiation.
The intersections of data and agents are evaluated through a series of tables looking at the
privacy and security concepts in light of data privacy - agent security, agent privacy - data
security, data privacy - data security, and agent privacy - agent security relationships. Data are
typically thought of as the focus of privacy and security. Data refers to information used in an
application and may relate to, for instance, manufacturing transactions, employees, application
users, customers, and so on. Some data are subject to privacy requirements more than other data.
Regulatory laws may dictate privacy and/or security functional requirements. HIPAA, for
instance, is an example that requires patient data to be kept secure (security requirement) and
have restricted access (privacy requirement), thus mixing the concepts of privacy and security in
a single set of requirements (HIPAA, XXXX).
Agents are the actors who might access, change, or copy data. Agents include not only
authorized application users, security staff, database staff, and computer operations staff, but also
include unauthorized employees, hackers, or other who seek access but are not authorized.
Each of the four figures presents a discrete view of privacy and security constructs in a
different context of analysis. The only construct that shows a consistent relationship across the
four types of analysis is non-repudiation. That is the data privacy - data security, data privacy agent security, agent privacy - data security, and agent privacy - agent security privacy -- nonrepudiation relationships are consistent for all privacy constructs.
Anonymity and integration/data profiling demonstrate a negative relationship with nonrepudiation. Recall that non-repudiation is the ability to identify with certainty either an agent or
some data. It is reasonable that this certain identification is antithetical to anonymity. Further,
by integrating data in some way, non-repudiation becomes impossible, therefore it also
demonstrates a negative relationship.
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The privacy characteristics of controlled life cycle, monitored use, Fair Use, and controlled
access all exhibit a positive relationship to non-repudiation. This means that with controlled
access, for instance, non-repudiation should also be possible, and vice versa.
To demonstrate the reasoning that underlies the designation of each cell, anonymity and its
relationships are traced through all four figures. Anonymity is chosen because, like availability,
it exhibits all relationships – supporting, negative, and neutral, depending on the data-agent
relationships involved.
Data privacy - data security and agent privacy - agent security anonymity and confidentiality
support each other. By support, we mean data (agent) anonymity supports or positively relates to
data (agent) confidentiality. Confidentiality relates to the maintenance of a secure environment
against leakages while anonymity relates to the lack of individual record (or person)
identification. Thus, while similar, the concepts are different. In the data privacy - data security
and agent privacy - agent security dyads, the relationship is a supporting one such that by the
presence of one condition, the other condition is facilitated.

Data Security

Data / Data

Data Privacy

Support
Neutral
Neutral

Support
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Figure 1. Data Privacy and Data Security Intersection
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Figure 2. Agent Privacy and Agent Security Intersection
In the data privacy - agent security condition (Figure 3), data anonymity and agent
confidentiality exhibit a neutral relationship. By neutral, we mean that regardless of one state
(e.g., data anonymity), no inferences about the state of the other characteristic (agent
confidentiality) can be made. For example, data on Wikipedia, whether valid or not, is
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anonymous. Since the data is anonymous, agent confidentiality can be maintained or not as
desired.
Conversely, in Figure 4, agent anonymity is counter or negatively related to data
confidentiality because with agent anonymity one would expect breaches to increase. Therefore,
a condition of security would be no agent anonymity.
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Figure 3. Data Privacy and Agent Security Intersection
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Figure 4. Agent Privacy and Data Security Intersection
One cell in Figure 3, relating to data anonymity and agent integrity, can exhibit either a
supporting or negative relationship depending on the context. For instance, in a company
setting, data anonymity is likely to exhibit a supporting relationship to agent integrity as an
individual is unlikely to change data that is not known to them. That is, a student might want to
change a course grade but, with student anonymity, the transgressor won't know which grade to
change. In contrast, in a setting such as Wikipedia, data anonymity may negatively relate to
agent integrity. The agent is more likely to change data in a self-serving way because the data is
anonymous.

Discussion
This paper seeks to raise issues and heighten awareness of privacy and security as separate
constructs, consisting of distinct characteristics. We hope to raise debate and discussion on the
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issues presented. We do not feel completely comfortable that our assessments might not be
changed through empirical research; in fact, we believe that each cell of each figure should
become an area for further research consideration to tease out the nuances and variations of the
relationships discussed.
The concept of 'Target of Evaluation' (TOE) is one that focuses attention on different facets
of a context, such as data privacy, agent privacy, contextual privacy, and so on. These different
facets have the potential to alter the outcome of the analysis by changing the privacy/security
characteristic relationships. Further, data is not a monolithic entity since the issues vary for data
'at rest,' 'in transit,' and being accessed. The 2008 Hannaford data breach in which hackers
installed malware on internal servers to capture credit card data in transit (Messmer, 2008).
Thus, even by following all Payment Card Industry (PCI) security regulations, privacy breaches
are not protected against. . Thus, other targets of data evaluation are needed to present a
complete view of data privacy/security issues. Just because industry security guidelines are met
does not mean that privacy concerns also are met. A similar situation seems to exist for agent
access. Agent restrictions in applications can be either functional, data-related, or both. These
multiple ways of thinking of agent capabilities should also be subjected as targets of evaluation.

Conclusion
While security addresses some privacy characteristics, and privacy implies some security
characteristics, the two constructs are distinct and should be treated separately. Which is a
greater concern -- to have security or privacy? As this discussion attests, this is no simply
question and the question has no simple solutions. The intersections between privacy and
security demonstrate that the trade-offs needed require consideration of many varied situations
and that the situational context itself may change the relative relationships between the privacy
and security characteristics. As a result, developing only a secure view of a computing
environment all but guarantees that privacy issues will be unsupported and, therefore,
problematic.
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